Key Weapons & Defence Systems
Iran
- Shahed‑136 & Shahed‑131 Drones – Low‑cost loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) used in massive swarm attacks to overwhelm air‑defence systems.
- Shahab‑3 Missile – Medium‑range ballistic missile, ~2,000 km range, backbone of Iran’s regional strike capability.
- Fattah Missile – Claimed hypersonic missile, up to Mach 15, range ~1,400 km, maneuverable re‑entry vehicle.
- Sejjil & Emad Missiles – Solid‑fuel MRBM (Sejjil) and precision‑guided long‑range BM (Emad) with maneuverable re‑entry vehicle.
- Bavar‑373 – Indigenous long‑range air‑defence system, comparable to Russia’s S‑300.
- Tor‑M1, Sevom‑e‑Khordad, Majid & Azarakhsh – Short‑range air‑defence suites against drones, cruise missiles and low‑flying threats.
- Paveh Cruise Missile – Land‑attack cruise missile, 1,650 km range, mid‑flight course‑change capability.
United States
- B‑2 Spirit Stealth Bomber – Low‑observable platform capable of delivering the GBU‑57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) (30,000 lb bunker‑buster).
- Tomahawk Cruise Missile – Sub‑sonic, GPS/INS/TERCOM/DSMAC guided, used for precision strikes on inland targets.
- LUCAS (Low‑Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System) – One‑way expendable attack drone designed to counter Iranian Shahed swarms.
- PrSM (Precision Strike Missile) – Short‑range ballistic missile launched from HIMARS, range up to 400 km.
- THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) – Hit‑to‑kill kinetic interceptor for short‑, medium‑ and limited intermediate‑range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase.
- Patriot PAC‑3, APKWS, Coyote Anti‑Drone System, SM‑3/SM‑6 – Layered air‑defence and anti‑drone capabilities.
- MQ‑9 Reaper, Boeing P‑8I – ISR and precision strike platforms.
Israel
- Blue Sparrow Missile – Air‑launched quasi‑ballistic missile, ~2,000 km range, briefly exits the atmosphere for harder interception.
- Jericho Missile Family – Jericho‑2 (1,500‑3,000 km MRBM) and Jericho‑3 (4,800‑6,500 km IRBM) forming Israel’s strategic deterrent.
- Arrow‑2 & Arrow‑3 – Ballistic‑missile‑defence; Arrow‑3 intercepts exo‑atmospheric threats.
- David’s Sling – Intercepts medium‑to‑long‑range rockets, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.
- Iron Dome & C‑Dome – Short‑range defence against rockets, artillery shells and drones; C‑Dome is the naval variant.
- Iron Beam – Directed‑energy laser system for low‑cost drone and projectile neutralisation.
- F‑35I “Adir” – Fifth‑generation stealth fighter enabling deep strikes while evading advanced air‑defences.
Background & Context
- The conflict marks the first large‑scale confrontation where drone swarms and hypersonic weapons have been deployed side‑by‑side with traditional ballistic missiles.
- Both the US and Israel have fielded integrated multi‑layered missile‑defence architectures (THAAD, Patriot, Arrow, Iron Dome) to protect critical assets and maintain strategic deterrence.
- Iran’s emphasis on low‑cost loitering munitions reflects a doctrine of asymmetric attrition, aiming to exhaust expensive interceptor inventories.
Significance for India & Policy Implications
- Technology Transfer & Indigenous Development – India’s DRDO can study these systems to accelerate indigenous anti‑drone, hypersonic and missile‑defence programmes.
- Strategic Stability – The proliferation of hypersonic and swarm‑drone capabilities raises the risk of rapid escalation; India must strengthen its early‑warning and command‑and‑control mechanisms.
- Regional Security – Iran’s missile reach (up to 2,000 km) covers parts of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, affecting India’s maritime security.
- International Collaboration – Understanding US‑Israel defence cooperation helps India negotiate technology‑sharing agreements and align its own defence procurement strategies.
Related Constitutional / Legal Provisions
- Article 253 of the Indian Constitution empowers the Union to enter into treaties and agreements concerning defence and external affairs, relevant for any future technology‑sharing pacts.
- The Defence Production Policy (2022) emphasizes indigenisation, encouraging development of cost‑effective counter‑UAV and missile‑defence systems.
All data are based on publicly available sources as of March 2026.