Key Facts and Data Points

  • PSLV‑C61 (May 2025) – Intended payload: EOS‑09 Earth observation satellite. Failure due to sudden drop in combustion‑chamber pressure in the third stage (PS3).
  • PSLV‑C62 (January 2026) – Intended payloads: EOS‑N1 (Anvesha) for DRDO + 15 commercial satellites. Failure due to roll‑rate disturbance and loss of control during PS3 burn.
  • PSLV specifications
  • Four‑stage launch vehicle (solid‑liquid‑solid‑liquid).
  • First stage: solid HTPB motor with six strap‑on boosters.
  • Second stage: Vikas liquid engine (UDMH/N₂O₄).
  • Third stage: solid HTPB motor – critical for final velocity; cannot be throttled.
  • Fourth stage: liquid MMH/MON engines for precise orbital insertion.
  • Payload capacity: 1,750 kg to 600 km Sun‑Synchronous Polar Orbit (SSPO).
  • Strategic payloads lost: Earth observation satellites essential for border surveillance, disaster management, and defence intelligence.
  • Commercial impact: India's global small‑satellite launch share fell from ~35 % in 2017 to near‑zero by 2024; insurance premiums expected to rise.

Background and Context

  • PSLV’s legacy: First successful launch in Oct 1994; workhorse for LEO and SSPO missions; enabled Chandrayaan‑1 and Mars Orbiter Mission.
  • Recent failures: Both linked to PS3 solid‑motor anomalies, suggesting systemic manufacturing or quality‑control issues.
  • Policy framework: Space activities governed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Act, 2008 and the Space Activities Bill (draft); Union List (Article 246) places space under central jurisdiction.

Significance for India / Governance / Policy

  • National security: Delay in deploying EO satellites creates intelligence “blind spots” affecting border monitoring and disaster response.
  • Commercial credibility: Repeated failures erode confidence of foreign customers, jeopardising revenue for NewSpace India Limited (NSIL) and the broader Indian space industry.
  • Supply‑chain vulnerability: Dependence on imports for space‑grade electronics, carbon‑fibre, semiconductors (import cost ~12× export earnings, 2021‑22) exposes the programme to export‑control risks.
  • Privatisation challenge: Transfer of 50 % PSLV development to HAL‑L&T consortium raises QA consistency concerns across tiers.

Recommended Measures (Policy & Technical)

  • Reliability‑first engineering: Shift from mission‑centric to fleet‑level reliability programmes; incremental validation of block upgrades.
  • Transparent failure analysis: Mandate timely public release of Failure Analysis Committee (FAC) reports, with redacted sensitive details.
  • Infrastructure diversification: Accelerate a second orbital launch site; operationalise alternative pads to reduce weather‑related and geopolitical risks.
  • Indigenisation drive: Prioritise domestic production of space‑grade electronics, TWTs, composites, and semiconductors; use assured government demand to de‑risk private suppliers.
  • Space Command empowerment: Establish a fully empowered Indian Space Command for ISR, SSA, and integration of space data into joint military operations.

Related Constitutional / Legal Provisions

  • Article 246 (Union List) – Gives Parliament exclusive power to legislate on space and related activities.
  • ISRO Act, 2008 – Provides statutory framework for ISRO’s functioning, including provisions for technology transfer and liability.
  • Space Activities Bill (draft) – Proposes a licensing regime, safety standards, and a liability framework aligned with the Outer Space Treaty.

Conclusion

The PSLV failures underscore that India’s space challenge has shifted from capability building to maintaining credibility, resilience, and execution. Addressing technical, supply‑chain, and policy gaps through transparent, systemic reforms is essential to safeguard strategic autonomy and revive India’s position in the global launch market.