Key Facts and Data Points

  • Iran
  • Shahed‑136 & Shahed‑131: Low‑cost loitering (kamikaze) drones used in swarm attacks.
  • Shahab‑3: Medium‑range ballistic missile, ~2,000 km range.
  • Fattah: Claimed hypersonic missile, up to Mach 15, 1,400 km range.
  • Paveh Cruise Missile: 1,650 km range, mid‑flight course‑changing capability.
  • Sejjil: Solid‑fuel MRBM, faster launch preparation than liquid‑fuel Shahab‑3.
  • Emad: Precision‑guided long‑range ballistic missile with maneuverable re‑entry vehicle (MaRV).
  • Bavar‑373: Long‑range air‑defence system, comparable to Russia’s S‑300.
  • Sevom‑e‑Khordad, Tor‑M1, Majid, Azarakhsh: Mobile/short‑range air‑defence against drones, cruise missiles and aircraft.
  • United States
  • B‑2 Spirit: Stealth bomber capable of delivering the GBU‑57 MOP (30,000 lb bunker‑buster).
  • Tomahawk Cruise Missile: Sub‑sonic, GPS/INS/TERCOM/DSMAC guided.
  • LUCAS Drone: Low‑cost one‑way attack drone designed to counter Iranian Shahed swarms.
  • PrSM (Precision Strike Missile): HIMARS‑launched, 400 km range.
  • THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – hit‑to‑kill interceptor for short‑, medium‑ and limited intermediate‑range ballistic missiles.
  • Patriot PAC‑3: Intercepts lower‑altitude threats such as cruise missiles and drones.
  • C‑Dome, Iron Beam, APKWS, Coyote: Anti‑drone and low‑cost precision‑kill systems.
  • SM‑3 & SM‑6: Sea‑based interceptors – SM‑3 for mid‑course exo‑atmospheric ballistic missiles, SM‑6 for terminal‑phase missiles, aircraft and drones.
  • Israel
  • Blue Sparrow: Air‑launched quasi‑ballistic missile, ~2,000 km range.
  • Jericho‑2 & Jericho‑3: MRBM (1,500‑3,000 km) and IRBM (4,800‑6,500 km) families – core of strategic deterrence.
  • Arrow‑2 & Arrow‑3: Ballistic‑missile defence – Arrow‑3 intercepts exo‑atmospheric threats.
  • David’s Sling: Bridges gap between Arrow and Iron Dome, targeting medium‑range rockets and cruise missiles.
  • Iron Dome: Short‑range system with high success against rockets, artillery shells and drones.
  • Iron Beam: Directed‑energy laser for low‑cost drone and projectile neutralisation.
  • C‑Dome: Naval version of Iron Dome deployed on Sa’ar‑6 corvettes.
  • F‑35I “Adir”: Fifth‑generation stealth fighter enabling deep strikes while evading advanced air‑defences.

Background and Context

  • The conflict escalated after a series of proxy confrontations in the Middle East, drawing the US and Israel into a direct kinetic exchange with Iran.
  • Both sides have leveraged unmanned systems, hypersonic technology, and layered missile‑defence architectures to achieve strategic objectives while attempting to minimise own casualties.
  • The war represents one of the most technology‑intensive engagements of the 21st century, highlighting the shift from conventional air‑to‑air battles to network‑centric, multi‑domain operations.

Significance for India / Governance / Policy

  • Strategic Balance: The deployment of hypersonic and long‑range ballistic missiles by Iran and Israel underscores the need for India to accelerate its own hypersonic programmes (e.g., HSTDV) and upgrade its missile‑defence shield.
  • Defence Procurement: Exposure to low‑cost expendable drones (Shahed, LUCAS) pushes India to consider anti‑drone solutions such as laser‑based systems (Iron Beam) and cost‑effective interceptors (C‑Dome, APKWS).
  • Regional Security: The conflict affects the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where US naval assets and Israeli maritime platforms operate; India must calibrate its diplomatic stance and maritime surveillance.
  • Technology Transfer & Indigenous Development: Observing the performance of systems like THAAD, Arrow‑3, and B‑2 can guide India’s indigenous projects (e.g., BrahMos‑2, DRDO’s Advanced Air‑Defence) and encourage public‑private partnerships.

Related Constitutional / Legal Provisions

  • Article 253 of the Constitution empowers the Union to enter into treaties and agreements relating to defence; any procurement of foreign systems (e.g., THAAD, Arrow) must be ratified under this provision.
  • Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2020 emphasizes ‘Make‑in‑India’; the conflict highlights the urgency of indigenising high‑tech missile and drone capabilities.
  • International Law: Use of hypersonic weapons raises questions under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) regarding distinction and proportionality, relevant for India’s future rules of engagement.

Prepared for UPSC Civil Services Examination – Current Affairs – Defence & International Relations